Abstract. The construction of a verifiable random function (VRF) with large input space and full adaptive security from a static, non-interactive complexity assumption, like decisional Diffie-Hellman, has proven to be a challenging task. To date it is not even clear that such a VRF exists. Most known constructions either allow only a small input space of polynomially-bounded size, or do not achieve full adaptive security under a static, non-interactive complexity assumption. The only known constructions without these restrictions are based on non-static, so-called "q-type" assumptions, which are parametrized by an integer q. Since q-type assumptions get stronger with larger q, it is desirable to have q as small as possible. In current constructions, q is either a polynomial (e.g., Hohenberger and Waters, Eurocrypt 2010) or at least linear (e.g., Boneh et al., CCS 2010) in the security parameter. We show that it is possible to construct relatively simple and efficient verifiable random functions with full adaptive security and large input space from noninteractive q-type assumptions, where q is only logarithmic in the security parameter. Interestingly, our VRF is essentially identical to the verifiable unpredictable function (VUF) by Lysyanskaya (Crypto 2002), but very different from Lysyanskaya's VRF from the same paper. Thus, our result can also be viewed as a new, direct VRF-security proof for Lysyanskaya's VUF. As a technical tool, we introduce and construct balanced admissible hash functions.
Introduction
Verifiable random functions. Verifiable random functions (VRFs) can be seen as the public-key equivalent of pseudorandom functions. Each function V sk is associated with a secret key sk and a corresponding public verification key vk . Given sk , an element X from the domain of V sk , and Y = V sk (X), it is possible to create a non-interactive, publicly verifiable proof π that Y was computed correctly. For security, unique provability is required. This means that for each X only one unique value Y such that the statement "Y = V sk (X)" can be proven may exist. Note that unique provability is a very strong requirement: not even the party that creates sk (possibly maliciously) may be able to create fake proofs. These additional features should not affect the pseudorandomness of the function on other inputs. Verifiable random functions are strongly related to verifiable unpredictable functions (VUFs), where the weaker notion of unpredictability instead of pseudorandomness is required.
Their strong properties make VRFs useful for applications like resettable zeroknowledge proofs [30] , lottery systems [31] , transaction escrow schemes [26] , updatable zero-knowledge databases [27] , or e-cash [3, 4] . VRFs can also be seen as verifiably unique digital signatures (called invariant signatures in [23] ), their uniqueness makes them strongly unforgeable [10, 35] .
The difficulty of constructing VRFs. In particular the unique provability requirement makes it very difficult to construct verifiable random functions. For instance, the natural attempt of combining a pseudorandom function with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system fails, since zero-knowledge proofs are inherently simulatable, which contradicts uniqueness. More generally, any reduction which attempts to prove pseudorandomness of a candidate construction faces the following problem.
-On the one hand, the reduction must be able to compute the unique function value Y := V sk (X) for preimages X selected by the attacker, along with a proof of correctness π. Due to the unique provability, there exists only one unique value Y such that the statement "Y = V sk (X)" can be proven, thus the reduction is not able to "lie" by outputting false valuesỸ . Note that this stands in contrast to typical reductions for pseudorandom functions, like the Naor-Reingold construction [33] for instance, where due to the absence of proofs the reduction is be able to output incorrect values. -On the other hand, the reduction must not be able to compute Y * = V sk (X * ) for a particular X * , as it must be able to use an attacker that distinguishes Y * from random to break a complexity assumption.
Most previous works [29, 28, 16, 17, 1] constructed VRFs with only small input spaces of polynomially-bounded size. 1 The only two exceptions are due to Hohenberger and Waters [25] and Boneh et al. [9] , who constructed verifiable random functions with full adaptive security that allow an input space of exponential size.
VRFs with large input spaces from non-interactive assumptions. Hohenberger and Waters [25] provided the first fully-secure VRF with exponential-size input space whose security is based on a non-interactive complexity assumption. The security proof relies on a q-type assumption, where an algorithm receives as input a list of group elements
where e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map. The assumption is that no efficient algorithm is able to distinguish T = e(g, h)
x q from a random group element with probability significantly better than 1/2. The proof given in [25] requires that q = Θ(Q · k), where k is the security parameter and Q is the number of function evaluations V sk (X) queried by the attacker in the security experiment. Note that in particular Q can be very large, as it is only bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter.
The construction of Boneh et al. [9] is based on the assumption where the algorithm receives as input a list of group elements
and the algorithm has to distinguish T = e(g, h) 1/x from random. The proof in [9] requires q = Θ(k). Is it possible to construct VRFs with large input and full adaptive security from weaker q-type assumptions?
Our contribution. We construct verifiable random functions with exponential-size input space, full adaptive security, and based on a q-type assumption with very small q. More precisely, q = O(log k) depends only logarithmically on the security parameter. The VRF construction essentially corresponds to the verifiable unpredictable function of Lysyanskaya [28] , which inspired many very similar VRF constructions with either weaker security or based on stronger assumptions [25, 1, 16] .
As a technical tool, we introduce the notion of balanced admissible hash functions (balanced AHFs), which are standard admissible hash functions [8] with an extra property (cf. the explanations below and in Section 4), and may be useful for applications beyond VRFs. We show how to construct balanced AHFs from codes with suitable minimal distance.
VRF construction. Let G, G T be groups with bilinear map e : G × G → G T , and let C : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n be a hash function. We construct a VRF with domain {0, 1} k and range G T . The verification key of our VRF consists of C along with 2n + 2 random elements of
The secret key consists of the discrete logarithms α i,j such that
The function is evaluated on input X ∈ {0, 1} k by first computing (C 1 , . . . , C n ) := C(X) and α X := 1. Construct a VUF based on a "computational" complexity assumption (in contrast to a "decisional" complexity assumption) 2. Turn this VUF into a VRF with single-bit output, by using a Goldreich-Levin hard-core predicate [22] . This step is not as simple as it may appear, because Micali et al. [29] show in their initial VRF paper that this only yields a VRF with polynomially-bounded input space (due to the fact that the randomness of the Goldreich-Levin hard-core predicate must be public to allow verifiability, which in turn leads to the problems discussed in [34] ). 3. Turn this single-bit-VRF into a VRF with many-bit output (still with poly-bounded input space), by applying a generic construction from [29] . Note that this generic construction requires many evaluations of the underlying single-bit VRF. 4. In order to extend the VRF to a larger input space, apply another generic treebased construction of [29] . Note that again this requires many evaluations of the underlying VRF.
In contrast, our direct VRF security proof of (essentially) the VUF-construction of Lysyanskaya yields directly a -in comparison much more simple and efficient -VRF with exponential-sized input space, adaptive security, and many-bit output. We rely on the new notion of balanced admissible hash functions in our security analysis.
Our security analysis and the need for balanced AHFs. We prove security under the qDDH-assumption, which states that given
it is hard to distinguish T = e(g, h)
from random. A qDDH-challenge is embedded into the view of the attacker by setting
where α i,j $ ← Z |G| is a random blinding term, but only for O(log k) carefully selected indices (i, j). This careful embedding essentially partitions the domain {0, 1}
k of the VRF into two sets X 0 , X 1 , such that -For all values X ∈ X 1 we have
where the γ i and γ j,i are integers in Z |G| which are known to the reduction. Note that the polynomials in the exponent of Equations (1) have degree at most q, thus V sk (X) and π 1 , . . . , π n can be computed, given the values (g, g x , . . . , g x q ) from the qDDH challenge and the integers γ i , γ j,i . -For all values X * ∈ X 0 the reduction is able to compute integers γ i such that
then it holds that Y * = V sk (X * ). Note that if T is random, then so is Y * .
Let {X (1) , . . . , X (Q) } denote the set of inputs on which the VRF-attacker queries the evaluation of the VRF with corresponding proof, and let X * denote the element such that the attacker attempts to distinguish V sk (X * ) from random. The reduction will succeed, if it holds that {X (1) , . . . , X (Q) } ⊆ X 1 and X * ∈ X 0 . Instantiating C with an admissible hash function ensures that with non-negligible probability it simultaneously holds that {X (1) , . . . , X (Q) } ⊆ X 1 and X * ∈ X 0 . However, unfortunately this is not yet sufficient to make the analysis of the success probability of our reduction go through, due to the incompatibility of partitioning proofs with "decisional" complexity assumptions, like qDDH. Intuitively, the problem stems from the fact that two different sequences of queries made by the attacker may cause the simulator to abort with different probabilities. This issue was explained in great detail in [37, 5, 14] .
Therefore we introduce the stronger notion of balanced AHFs. Essentially, a balanced AHF ensures that the upper bound γ max and the lower bound γ min on the probability in
are reasonably close. This is a typical requirement for partitioning proofs based on decisional complexity assumptions, it occurs both in reductions with and without the "artificial abort" [37, 5] . This suggests that the notion of balanced AHFs may find applications beyond the construction of VRFs. We stress that we achieve a reduction from a q-type assumption with q = O(log k) only if we instantiate the VRF construction with a specific AHF, essentially the codebased AHF of [19, 28] . The reason is that this is the only construction we are aware of which allows us to embed the given qDDH-challenge into at most O(log k) carefully selected public-key elements g i,j in the way described above. We still have to prove that their AHF is also a balanced AHF.
More related work. VRFs were introduced by Micali, Rabin, and Vadhan [29] , along with verifiable unpredictable functions (VUFs), a generic conversion from VUFs to VRFs based on Goldreich-Levin hard-core predicates [22] , and a VUF-construction (with small input space) based on the RSA assumption. Specific, number-theoretic constructions of VRFs can be found in [29, 28, 16, 17, 1, 25, 9] . Note that most of these constructions either do not achieve full adaptive security for large input spaces, or are based on much stronger, interactive complexity assumptions. In particular, the VRF construction of Dodis [16] with outer error-correcting code is based on a q-type assumption (there called the sf-DDH assumption of order q) with q = O(log k), but this assumption is interactive. We wish to avoid interactive assumptions to prevent circular arguments, as explained by Naor [32] .
Abdalla et al. gave generic constructions of VRFs from so-called VRF-suitable identity-based KEMs [1, 2] . While the conference version of this paper [1] considered only selective security, the full version [2] contains proofs that the construction from [1] achieves full security, under either under the complexity assumption from [25] with polynomially-bounded q, or, alternatively, under a q-type assumption with q = O(k) when combined with an admissible hash function.
Brakerski et al. [11] introduced the relaxed notion of weak VRFs, along with simple and efficient constructions, and proofs that neither VRFs, nor weak VRFs can be constructed (in a black-box way) from one-way permutations. Fiore and Schröder [18] proved that verifiable random functions are not even implied (in a black-box sense) by trapdoor permutations. Several works introduced related primitives, like simulatable VRFs [12] and constrained VRFs [21] .
At Eurocrypt 2006, Cheon [15] described an algorithm, which computes the discrete logarithm x on input (g, g x , . . . , g
. This algorithm is faster by a factor of √ q than generic algorithms for the standard discrete logarithm problem where only (g, g x ) is given. This shows that q-type assumptions are particularly problematic when q is large. The security loss must be compensated with larger group parameters, at the cost of efficiency. We stress that Cheon's algorithm is only much faster than generic algorithms for the standard discrete logarithm problem if q is very large (say, q = 2 40 ). However, Cheon's algorithm gives no apparent reason to criticise q-type assumptions for small q, like q ≤ 40.
On avoiding q-Type assumptions altogether. Chase and Meiklejohn [13] present a conversion that allows to replace q-type assumption in certain applications with a static (that is, not q-type) subgroup hiding assumption, by leveraging the dual-systems techniques of Waters [36] . It is natural to ask whether these techniques can be used to construct verifiable random functions from static assumptions. Unfortunately, the conversion of [13] requires to add randomization. Thus, when applying it to known VRF constructions like [17] , then this contradicts the unique provability requirement. Accordingly, Chase and Meiklejohn were able to prove that the VRF of Dodis and Yampolski [17] forms a secure pseudorandom function under a static assumption, but not that it is a secure verifiable random function.
We leave the construction of a verifiable random function with large input space and full adaptive security from a static assumption, like Decisional Diffie-Hellman, as an open problem.
Preliminaries
For a vector K ∈ {0, 1} n we write K i to denote the i-th component of K. If A is a finite set, then a $ ← A denotes the action of sampling a uniformly random from A. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then we write a $ ← A to denote the action of computing a by running A with uniformly random coins. We define [n] := {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N as the set of all positive integers up to n.
Verifiable Unpredictable/Random Functions
Let (Gen, Eval, Vfy) be the following algorithms.
takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a key pair (vk , sk ). We say that sk is the secret key and vk is the verification key.
-Algorithm (Y, π) $ ← Eval(sk , X) takes as input secret key sk and X ∈ {0, 1} k , and outputs a function value Y ∈ Y, where Y is a finite set, and a proof π. We write V sk (X) to denote the function value Y computed by Eval on input (sk , X).
-Algorithm Vfy(vk , X, Y, π) ∈ {0, 1} takes as input verification key vk , X ∈ {0, 1} k , Y ∈ Y, and proof π, and outputs a bit.
Initialize : is the output of the game. Moreover, A may arbitrarily issue Evaluate-queries, but only after querying Initialize and before querying Finalize VRF . We say that A is legitimate, if A never queries Evaluate(X) and Challenge(X * ) with X = X * throughout the game. We define the advantage of A in breaking the pseudorandomness as
Definition 2. We say that (Gen, Eval, Vfy) is a verifiable unpredictable function (VUF) if the correctness and unique provability properties from Definition 1 hold, and we have:
Unpredictability. Consider an attacker A with access (via oracle queries) to the procedures defined in Figure 1 . Let G A VUF denote the game where A first queries Initialize, then an arbitrary number of Evaluate-queries, then Finalize VUF , and the output of Finalize VUF is the output of the game. We say that A is legitimate, if A never queries Evaluate(X) and Challenge(X * ) with X = X * throughout the game. We define the advantage of A in breaking the unpredictability as
q-Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
In the sequel let G, G T begroups of prime order, with bilinear map e : G × G → G T .
, h) then Return 1 Else Return 0 
Main Construction
Let G, G T be groups of prime order with bilinear map e : G × G → G T , such that each group element has a unique representation, and that group membership can be tested efficiently.
Let VF = (Gen, Eval, Vfy) be the following construction. Evaluation. On input X ∈ {0, 1} k , algorithm Eval(sk , X) first computes C(X). For i ∈ [n] let C(X) i denote the i-th bit of C(X) ∈ {0, 1} n . Then the algorithm determines the function value by computing a X := n i=1 α i,C(X)i and setting Y := e(g, h)
a X .
The corresponding proof π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) is computed recursively by first defining π 0 := g and then setting
The algorithm outputs (Y, π). Verification. Algorithm Vfy(vk , X, Y, π) checks the consistency of π using the bilinear map. It first tests if X and π contain only valid group elements. Then it computes C(X) = (C(X) 1 , . . . , C(X) n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , defines π 0 := g, and outputs 1 if and only if all the following equations are satisfied.
It is straightforward to verify that the above construction is correct in the sense of Definitions 1 and 2. Furthermore, the unique provability follows from the group structure and the fact that even an unbounded attacker is not able to devise a proof π for a different group element. It remains to prove pseudorandomness.
Balanced Admissible Hash Functions
Standard admissible hash functions (AHFs) were introduced by Boneh and Boyen [8] , a simplified definition was given by Freire et al. [19] . For our application, we will need AHFs with stronger properties, therefore we have to extend the notion of AHFs to balanced AHFs. The essential difference between balanced AHFs and the standard definition (e.g. [20, Definition 3] ) is that previous works required only a reasonable lower bound on the probability in Equation (3) below. In contrast, the security analysis of our VRF construction will essentially require reasonable upper and lower bounds, and that these bounds are sufficiently close.
Definition 5. Let k ∈ N and n = n(k) be a polynomial, and let C : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n(k) be an efficiently computable function. Let F K : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} be defined as
We say that C is a balanced admissible hash function (balanced AHF), if there exists an efficient algorithm AdmSmp(1 k , Q, δ), which takes as input (Q, δ) where Q = Q(k) ∈ N is polynomially bounded and δ = δ(k) ∈ (0, 1] is non-negligible, and outputs K ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n such that for all X (1) , . . . , X (Q) , X * ∈ {0, 1} k with X * ∈ {X (1) , . . . , X (Q) } holds that
where γ max (k) and γ min (k) satisfy that the function τ (k) defined as
is non-negligible. The probability is taken over the choice of K.
Remark 1. The definition of τ essentially condenses two requirements, namely (1) that γ min is non-negligible, and (2) that the difference γ max − γ min is "reasonably" small, where "reasonably" depends on γ min and δ. The definition of function τ may appear very specific, however, such a term appears typically in security analyses that follow the approach of Bellare and Ristenpart [5] . Therefore we think this is exactly what is needed for typical applications of balanced AHFs. See Lemma 1, for instance.
Instantiating balanced admissible hash functions. Efficient standard admissible hash functions are known to exist [28, 8, 19] . For instance, there is a simple construction from codes with suitable minimal distance [28, 19] . In this section we will show that such codes also yield a balanced AHF. In contrast to [28, 19] , we have to show both upper and lower bounds, and choose certain parameters more carefully to ensure that (4) is a non-negligible function.
n be a family of codes with minimal distance nc for a constant c. Then (C k ) k∈N is a family of balanced admissible hash functions. Moreover, AdmSmp(1 k , Q, δ) outputs K ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n with exactly
− ln((1−c)) components not equal to ⊥. Proof. Consider the algorithm AdmSmp which sets
and chooses K uniformly random from ({0, 1} ∪ {⊥}) n with exactly d components not equal to ⊥.
} for the analysis of this algorithm.
Upper bound. Note that we have Pr[F K (X * ) = 0] = 2 −d , and thus
Lower bound. We first observe that for any two strings X, X * ∈ {0, 1} k with X = X * holds that
To see this, consider an experiment where two code words C(X) and C(X * ) are given, with X, X * ∈ {0, 1} k and X = X * , and we sample d pairwise distinct positions
. Since C(X) and C(X * ) differ in at least nc positions, the probability that
This yields the lower bound
Balancedness of bounds. Finally, it remains to show that for polynomial Q and nonnegligible δ the function τ from (4) is non-negligible. We first compute (omitting the parameter k from functions to simplify notation):
Now we will show that if d is chosen as above, then both 2 −d and 2δ−(2δ+1)·Q(1−c) d are non-negligible. Thus, their product is non-negligible as well. We have
which both are non-negligible since c is a constant, Q ∈ N, and δ ∈ (0, 1] is nonnegligible.
VF is a Verifiable Random Function
Theorem 2. If VF is instantiated with the balanced admissible hash function from Theorem 1, then for any legitimate attacker A that breaks the pseudorandomness of VF in time t A with advantage Adv VRF A by making at most Q Eval-queries, there exists an algorithm B that breaks the q-DDH assumption with q = ln(2Q+Q/δ) − ln ((1−c) ) − 1 in time t B ≈ t A and with advantage
where 2 · δ is a non-negligible lower bound on Adv VRF A (k), and τ (k) is a non-negligible function. Proof. Algorithm B receives as input (g, g x , . . . , g
x q , h, T ) and runs algorithm A as a subroutine. Whenever A queries Initialize, Evaluate, Challenge, or Finalize, B executes the corresponding procedure from Figure 3 . Let us give some remarks on these procedures.
Initialization. The values (g, h, g x ) in Initialize are from the qDDH-challenge. Recall that 2 · δ is a non-negligible lower bound on Adv VRF A (k), and Q is the upper bound on the number of Evaluate-queries.
Note that B computes the g i,j -values exactly as in the original Gen-algorithm, by choosing α i,j $ ← Z |G| and setting g i,j := g αi,j , but with the exception that
for all (i, j) ∈ [n] × {0, 1} with K i = j. Due to our choice of an admissible hash function according to Theorem 1, there are exactly q + 1 components K i of K which are not equal to ⊥. Finally, note that all g i,Ki -values are distributed correctly, and that this set-up defines the secret key implicitly as sk := (log g g i,j ) (i,j)∈[n]×{0,1} . Thus, the function V sk (X) is well-defined for all X (but B will not be able to evaluate V sk on all inputs X, as explained below).
Helping definitions. In order to explain how B responds to Evaluate and Challenge queries made by A, let us define two sets I K,w,X and J K,w,X , which depend on an AHF key K, a VRF input X ∈ {0, 1} k , and integer w ∈ N with 1 ≤ w ≤ n, as
Note that I K,w,X denotes the set of all indices i ∈ [w] ⊆ [n] such that K i = C(X) i , and J K,w,X denotes the set of all indices in [w] which are not contained in I K,w,X . Based on these sets, we define polynomials P K,w,X (x)
Now we can make the following observations:
1. For all X with F K (X) = 1, the set I K,w,X contains at most q elements, and thus the polynomial P K,w,X (x) has degree at most q. This implies that if F K (X) = 1, then B can efficiently compute g P K,w,X (x) for all w ∈ [n]. To this end, B first computes the coefficients γ 0 , . . . , γ q of the polynomial P K,w,X (x) = q i=0 γ i x i with degree at most q, and then
γi using the terms (g, g x , . . . , g x q ) from the q-DDH challenge.
2. If F K (X) = 0, then P K,n,X (x) has degree q + 1. We do not know how B can efficiently compute g P K,n,X (x) in this case.
Responding to Evaluate-queries. If F K (X) = 1, then procedure Evaluate computes the group elements g P K,w,X (x) as explained above. Note that in this case the response to the Evaluate(X)-query of A is correct. However, if F K (X) = 0, then the response of B is incorrect.
Responding to the Challenge-query. If F K (X * ) = 0, then procedure Challenge computes
where γ 0 , . . . , γ q+1 are the coefficients of the degree-(q+1)-polynomial
, then it holds that Y * = V sk (X * ). Moreover, if T is uniformly random, then so is Y * .
Analysis of B's running time. The running time t B of B consists essentially of the running time t A of A plus a minor number of additional operations, thus we have t B ≈ t A .
Analysis of B's success probability. The simulation of the challenger by B is perfect, unless bad := 1 is set. This happens only if A queries Evaluate(X) with F K (X) = 1, or Challenge(X * ) with F K (X * ) = 1. Since the AHF key K is information-theoretically hidden in vk , the terms γ max and γ min from Equation (3) are upper and lower bounds on the probability that bad := 1 is never set throughout the experiment.
Lemma 1.
Adv
The proof of Lemma 1 follows the approach of Bellare and Ristenpart [5] very closely, therefore it is deferred to Appendix A. This approach allows us to provide an analysis without the "artificial abort" of Waters [37] . The latter has also been used to analyze the VRF of Hohenberger and Waters [24] , but leads to a less tight reduction. Observe that since we instantiate C with a balanced AHF and δ is a non-negligible lower bound on Adv
is non-negligible. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
VF is a Verifiable Unpredictable Function
In this section we prove that construction VF also is a secure VUF. Note that this construction is essentially identical to the VUF of Lysyanskaya [28] , only the proof is based on a different complexity assumption. The main purpose of this section is to show that for the VUF-security proof of VF an even weaker (but still O(log k)) q-type assumption is sufficient. We can base security on a qCDH assumption that is weaker in two ways. First, it is the computational version of the qDDH assumption. Second, we need only q = (ln 2Q)/c − 1. Thus, in contrast to the VRF-security proof, q is independent of the advantage of the attacker.
Admissible Hash Functions
In order to prove that VF is a VUF, it will suffice to instantiate VF with a standard (that is, not necessarily balanced) admissible hash function C. We recall the standard definition of admissible hash functions (AHFs) from Freire et al. [19] .
Definition 6 ([19]
). Let k ∈ N and n = n(k) be a polynomial, and let C : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n(k) be an efficiently computable function. Let F K : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} be defined as in Equation (2). We say that C is an admissible hash function (AHF), if there exists an efficient algorithm AdmSmp(1 k , Q), which takes as input polynomial Q = Q(k) ∈ N, and computes K ∈ ({0, 1} ∪ {⊥})
n such that for all
such that γ min (k) non-negligible. The probability is taken over the choice of K.
Instantiating Admissible Hash Functions. A simple and efficient construction of AHFs can be found in [19] (based on [28] ), we capture their existence in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ( [28, 19] ). Let S be a set and (C k ) k∈N with C k : {0, 1} k → S n be a family of codes, with minimal distance nc for a constant c and such that |S| is bounded by a polynomial in k. Then (C k ) k∈N is an admissible hash function, where AdmSmp(Q) outputs K ∈ S ∪ {⊥} n with exactly d := (ln 2Q)/c components not equal to ⊥ and The proof of this theorem is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 2, but the analysis of the success probability of B is much simpler, because we consider unpredictability instead of pseudorandomness. Therefore we only sketch the proof.
Proof. Algorithm B receives as input (g, g x , . . . , g . We will need the following lemma from [5, 7] . Lemma 3 ( [5, 7] ). Let G i and G j be two games which proceed identical until bad = 1. A simpler-to-analyze game. Following Bellare and Ristenpart [5] , we now gradually make changes to game G qDDH B(A) , until we reach game G 3 , which will be easier to analyze. In the sequel let good i denote the event that bad is never set to bad = 1 in Game i.
